Source: WV History Film Project
INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD CURRY
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 1, CAMERA 257,
SOUND 99
Q: Dick, let's lead up to these events. Give me a
sense in a very general picture of what forces started
brewing in West Virginia in the first half of the,
western Virginia, in the first half of the 19th century
that led to conflict?
JJGC 0069
RC: Basically, I think it was sectional conflict, the
fact that Virginia was settled from the east and you
have smaller counties. And those counties averaged,
say in 1830, 1500 people. Each one had two
representatives in the General Assembly in the House
of Burgesses. However, west of the mountains which
is now West Virginia, your population came not
primarily from the east, but they came down the
Shenandoah Valley, the Cumberland Gap, across the
Alleghenies, the counties they were much larger.
7500 people, two representatives, so you have this
tremendous disproportionate representation.
JJGC 0144
Eastern Virginia, the Piedmont and the tidewater
dominated the politics throughout Virginia's history
down into the Civil War to create a tremendous
resentment in western Virginia. The first governor
from west of the Blue Ridge was not elected until
1850, for example and the difference I say over
representation had practical consequences over how
much money is going to be allocated for internal
improvements for public education. How much
money for Indian defense? And the answer is very
little; comparatively speaking the east always
controlled the west we see paid high taxes higher
taxes and received fewer benefits.
JJGC 0221
So early on, as early as say the Staunton Convention
in 1815, perhaps even before the Convention of 1788,
you have some western Virginians talking about the
possibility of -- well, agitating for reform but
ultimately by 1830 forming separate state. Now,
what happened between 1830 and 1860 is critical if
you have the convention of 1830; I forget who it was
when eastern Virginia politician referred to West
Virginia as "hewers of wood and drawers of water,"
the peasantry of the west which didn't go across too
well, still doesn't. And there were demands for
change in the Convention of 1830 for universal Negro
suffrage that didn't happen for reform in the number
of representatives that western Virginia had in
Richmond -- that didn't occur.
Q: Let me interrupt you.
RC: Sure.
Q: Just take a cut. If a first whirl we always kind of slow.
CURRY INTERVIEW - TAKE 2 CAMERA 257
Q: Tell me about that statement from that eastern
Virginia politician.
JJGC 0337
RC: Well, it was during the Virginia Convention of
1830 which was called to bring about political reform
in the state. And this Virginia politician from the east
stated that western Virginians were "hewers of wood
and drawers of water" that they were really the
peasantry of the west and that they weren't really
entitled to equal representation in the Legislature. Of
course, what the Virginia politicians in eastern
Virginia were attempting to do was protect their
slaveholding, their slave property. And the west was
a non-slaveholding area; oh, and the southern part of
what is now West Virginia had 18,000 slaves, but, for
the most part, we were very sparsely, very few slaves
and this, of course, was a factor which caused,
generated resentment too. Not only because of
resentment of slavery, but what slavery did to whites,
quite frankly.
JJGC 0428
Just because you were anti- eastern Virginia doesn't
necessarily mean you were enlightened in your racial
attitudes, but what it meant was domination of the
east meant higher taxes for the west and very little
money for transportation for tug canals??, for
turnpikes. Very little money for Indian defense, very
little money for public education and so the
resentment of western Virginians against the east,
against the "tidewater aristocrats" as they were
referred to goes away back into the nineteenth
century, goes all the way back to the Staunton
Convention of 1815 and, perhaps, as early as the
Convention of 1788. But, really the eastern part of
the state refused to make any concessions to the west,
and in 1861 when the Virginia Convention of 1861
which became known as the Succession Convention
of '61, now. Then, of course, the western counties,
particularly the northwest, united against secession, I
mean the vote in the Convention was 88 to 55, and
most of those votes came from the northwestern
counties of Virginia. I think one point that needs to
be made is the changing nature of sectional conflict in
Virginia after 1830.
JJGC 0559
In 1830, the whole west, that is west of the Blue
Ridge, you have almost universal resentment of the
domination of the state by the east. But, between
1830 and 1860, the southwestern part of the state (by
that I mean counties such as Greenbrier, Monroe,
Kanawha, Cabell, Mason and others), their
resentment against the east lessened to some degree
because of the construction of the, on the James River
and Kanawha Turnpike upon the railroad that came
through the Tennessee and ??? (I forget the exact
name of the railroad), buy that tended to link eastern
and southwestern Virginia together. It is the
northwestern part of the state that becomes
increasingly isolated from the rest of the state.
Industrialization is part of that, but the other part, too,
is that the northwestern counties had more in common
with the Middle West and the east than they did with
eastern Virginia. At the same time, they are isolated,
underrepresented, and were scorned.
JJGC 0674
The House of Burgesses in 1861 tried to bribe (I can't
think of a better word) tried to bribe the northwestern
counties which lead the [tech difficulty, muffled] ??
by saying "Well, if you will go along with us, we will
succeed from the Union, then we will give you the
changes that you want, then we will give you equal
representation. We will give you tax breaks, we will
give you more money for schools, etc." And the
northwestern counties at the Wheeling Convention
lived by John Carlile and Archibald Campbell and
others, told the east, in effect, a resounding "No!" is
the most polite way I can phrase it. I was going to use
something more colorful, but by this time the
northwest was determined to have separate statehood
and it was the Civil War which gave the northwestern
counties their opportunity; had there been no Civil
War, there would, of course, had been no West
Virginia.
PAUSE. [Tech difficulties, speaker difficulty]
RC: I think that's true of north and south, in general,
were non slave-holding.
Q: Would you start with the complete sentence.
I think the view of slavery is true throughout
what.
JJGC 0845
RC: Well, when I talk about the so-called causes of
the Civil War, one of the points I [tech difficulty, lost
sound] ?? The attitudes that I find in the north and,
indeed, in western Virginia as opposed to eastern
Virginia wherein in east Tennessee as opposed to the
rest of the state of Tennessee, is their opposition not
so much to slavery, but to southern domination or to
planter domination of the state or the south. In short,
to say that the north was anti-southern is more
accurate, it seems to me than to say that they were
anti-slavery. You say that they were anti-slavery this
may imply a degree of sympathy for black people or
for African-Americans, which is not the case in the
nineteenth century. Most nineteenth century
Americans were race conscience, including
northerners. However, they resented southern
domination in the Congress or the Supreme Court. In
the case of the [tech difficulty, muffled sound, can't
hear, pause]
WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY PROJECT ROLL 100 CAMERA ROLL 258 RICHARD CURRY INTERVIEW, APRIL 30. CURRY INTERVIEW TAKE 3, CAMERA 258, SOUND 100.
RC: Well, the lower south is, O, I'm sorry.
Q: OK. Position us for the struggle for Virginia.
Tell me about what that was.
JJGC 0973
RC: Well, after the lower south had succeeded
between November and January of 1861, then every
other southern state goes into Convention, North
Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Virginia. Virginia
was the big question because it was after all the
"Mother" of the Union, if you will. It had helped to
establish the United States and played a major role.
Most of the early presidents were from Virginia and
so there were ties to Union here; they were to be
broken very begrudgingly and reluctantly. And
president-elect Lincoln thought that Virginia would,
basically, be a Union state. But, what Lincoln
perceived the situation somewhat wrongly, because
Virginians were, what they called, conditionally in
this.
JJGC 1065
I mean, you have basically in the Virginia Convention
of 1861, you have basically three divisions of people.
You have the immediate secessionists who want to
succeed right now, yesterday, about 20%. About
20% of the delegates, mostly western Virginians who
became West Virginians, 20% who opposed secession
at all costs. The key here was the other 60% who
wanted to preserve the Union, but they were
conditional Unionists. They want the north to
guarantee what they considered to be the sovereign
rights of sovereign states. In other words, they did not
want Federal interference in slavery or any other issue
involving the "The Rights of the South." So what
Lincoln didn't understand, and other northerners didn't
understand, that when the vote was announced for
election of delegates to the Richmond Convention,
that this was a victory for Unionism. It was
conditionally Unionism.
JJGC 1161
So finally, after the attack on Fort Sumter, when
Lincoln issued his famous call for 75,000 volunteers,
this is what produced the vote in the Virginia
Convention and the vote turned out 85, no 88 to 55,
in favor of secession. Where did most of the 55 votes
in opposition come from? Some of them came from
the Valley, the Valley of Virginia knew that they
would be caught in the War, but most of them came
from the northwestern counties of Virginia which
became part of West Virginia. The population of the
state say from the Blue Ridge, west, the white
population was much greater west of the Blue Ridge
than east of the Blue Ridge, but they were
underrepresented. So what you have is a reflection
here of most of the counties, not all, in the
northwestern part of the state voted against secession
and would do so at all costs. The rest of the state
voted for it.
Q: OK. Let me ask you about those people west
of the Blue Ridge. You can feel comfortable referring
to these people in this area as western Virginia. We
have established that as a way of referring to it, rather
than West Virginia at this point. What did the farmer
in Greenbrier County, the farmer outside of
Clarksburg in his fields, what did he think about the
idea of leaving the Union over slavery?
JJGC 1314
RC: Again, I think it's not so much a question of
status or occupation as it is of sectional and regional
difference. Not that all western Virginians from
Greenbrier favored secession, most of them did. Or in
the northwest, let's say up in Monongalia County, or
Harrison or Marion; again, you have a Confederate
minority in all these counties. About 85% of the
citizens of Monongalia County, for example, favored
the preservation of the Union, rejected secession. The
overwhelming sentiment of counties in the lower part
of West Virginia -- Cabell, Greenbrier, Monroe,
McDowell and others -- and even in the central part of
the state, you have maybe, you can see the divisions, I
mean it is a 60/40 split in terms of population. The
forty being in favor of the Confederacy, the sixty in
favor of the Union, but in terms of territory it's the
other way around.
JJGC 1430
In terms of territory, most of West Virginia favored
the confederacy. It is, if you draw a line, and take the
upper third of West Virginia in the northwest, that is
where union sentiment exists, and that's where the
centers of population are because the northwestern
counties are far more populace, far more prosperous
than the southern counties and even the Valley
counties.
Q: Just briefly tell me again why was a
Mountaineer in the southern Congress philosophically
aligned with the cause of the south in
comparison?
JJGC 1500
RC: Well, you do; the only part of the state where
slaves exist is in the southern part of the state, most of
them, not that you don't have household servants here
and there. But, there were 18,000 slaves in all of
West Virginia -- 2,000 of those were in Greenbrier.
But, and these people were sensitive to northern
attacks of northern abolitionists on slavery. But, not
only on slavery, but on southern honor, on southern
conceptions of morality. In other words, you are not
talking about twentieth century Americans. Whether
slave-holding or non slave-holding, people who were
repelled by slavery or by human bondage. That's a
relatively recent phenomenon in American society.
Most Unionists were also racists, they were
anti-southern but, not necessarily anti-slavery would
have made concessions, perhaps, to -- I mean even
Lincoln for example, once stated that he would
guarantee if he could or if the south would stay in the
Union the continued existence of slavery in perpetuity
would existed;
JJGC 1640
I don't mean to suggest that Lincoln was pro-southern
for slavery; he certainly was not, but the point is that
most Americans thought about issues in addition to
slavery or in addition to race about, you know, very
important were concerned about economic questions.
I mean the south were on a low tariff. The northeast
wanted a high tariff; the west was divided depending
upon what kind of agriculture you are talking at. If
you go hemp?? perhaps you favor a tariff, if you grow
corn or cotton you oppose the tariff. There are
differences over internal improvements, particularly
on how the Federal government should spend its
funds, or should the Federal government build
railroads and canals and turnpikes, or should this be
done by private enterprise. Sounds familiar, arguous
?? even today in a similar vein.
Q: Let me interrupt - What role did the pattern of
settlement play when you say that one of them links
between the Greenbrier man and a Richmond man
was the sense of southern honor? Why wasn't there
that link between a Wheeling man and a Richmond
man?
JJGC 1763
RC: Well, as I, that's a very difficult question to
answer. I'll give it a try; but, for example, as I said
earlier, in the northwest, you have a much more
diverse economy. You do have industrialization.
You do have the building of the B & O Railway from
Baltimore down to Cincinnati. You do have the Ohio
River trade and commerce going into Cincinnati. In
these terms, economic interest, northwestern Virginia
does not identify economically with eastern Virginia
or the south with King Cotton. As John Carlile had
said, he would not go along with, become a servant or
a slave to King Cotton. It is not in our interest to do
so. The influence of the Methodist Church, for
example, in northwestern Virginia. Someone once, I
forget who it was who argued in effect, that the
Methodist missionaries, the Methodist circuit riders
probably played as major a role in rallying support
for the Union as any other religious group in the
whole state.
JJGC 1885
The southern part is much more traditional, it is much
more agrarian. You will begin to see in time the
industrialization up in the upper Kanawha, but I find
this lack of diversity leads to much more of a
traditional type of mentality. A greater concern for
tradition, for state's rights. I, well, there's a concept
that I like in a non-slave holding area of the south --
why did they support the Confederacy if they had no
interest in, direct interest in supporting slavery? The
concept --
Q: Hold that thought, we'll just ran out of film.
INTERVIEW 10, April 30
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAPE 4, ROLL 259,
SOUND ROLL 101
Q: It is April, 1861. The mobs are in the streets
of Richmond getting all fired-up about secession.
Delegates are meeting inside the Capitol talking
about secession. In marches a man from
Harrison.
JJGD 0035
RC: Well, this obscure politician from western
Virginia in John Carlile makes any number of
dramatic statements that I forget the exact quotation,
but he denounces King Cotton and the Confederacy in
no uncertain terms. He will not accept secession and
it's Carlile who not only votes against it, but as soon
as that vote is cast, he leaves for Washington, DC. It
is Carlile that informs President Lincoln that Virginia
has voted to succeed. It is Carlile then who rushes to
Clarksburg and starts a new statehood movement, but
they want to call the new state, not West Virginia, but
New Virginia and Carlile and others, Archibald
Campbell, John J. Davis and others are calling for
elections and delegates. There will be many of these
delegates, when elected, they just arrived.
Q: OK. Would you set your picture? Tell me,
what was the reaction of the more staid and polished
eastern Virginia politicians to John Carlile at the
Convention? What was the reaction in
Richmond?
RC: Well, I would assume that they, essentially,
treated western Virginians with contempt. They did
try to woo them with promises of change, of greater
representation, of more money for general
improvements.
Q: Would you mind starting that again, and
instead of the pronoun "they" saying "eastern
Virginians?"
JJGD 0186
RC: I think eastern Virginians still, in 1861, held
western Virginians, more or less, in contempt.
However, they understood that there was strong
Union sentiment in the northwest. Eastern Virginians,
in an effort to overcome that, made promises of giving
them greater representation, of more money for
internal improvements, of more money for education
or for canals and turnpikes. But still, they had not
made concessions, meaningful concessions, for the
past hundred years and western Virginians, at this
point in time, had had it. They were not going along
for domestic reform within Virginia in exchange for
secession. They saw this as their golden opportunity
to seek what many politicians, including Carlile and
Davis and Campbell and others and Waitman T.
Willey saw it as an opportunity to create a state of
New Virginia, and it was Carlile who was the hero of
the masses.
JJGD 0295
It was Carlile who, after all, became Senator, United
States Senator from the Wheeling government when it
was organized in 1861, who led this movement and
they took this as the our opportunity to realize this, it's
not only what do eastern Virginians think of us -- they
hate our guts, they look upon us with contempt, but,
what do we think of them? Here is our chance to get
the hell out, here's our chance to become New
Virginians.
Q: Sorry, we have a battery out, Oh.
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 5, ROLL 259
Q: OK. In April, Richmond Convention votes
for Virginia to succeed.
RC: Right.
Q: John Carlile goes to Washington tells
Lincoln. Comes west of the mountains.
RC: Rushes to Clarksburg.
Q: Tell me what he did, tell me what the reaction
was, tell me what the atmosphere was.
JJGD 0395
RC: Well, one can only imagine what it was in the
sense that you know that the population reacted with,
in the northwestern part of the state, with almost
unanimously against secession. Carlile is calling for,
I think the Clarksburg resolutions are issued and
distributed by horseback to all regions, all sections, of
the northwest. The Wheeling Intelligencer,
edited by Carlile, I mean, by Campbell Archibald
Campbell, of course, is writing fiery editorials to
calling the population to resist. Carlile is the "Man of
the Hour" in the sense that he is the politician who is
out front imploring the masses to resist treason and
secession and he is rewarded, ultimately, for his
leadership and his eloquence, he is a very eloquent
speaker, by being appointed United States Senator
from the restored government of Virginia.
JJGD 0495
Archibald Campbell is, of course, a very powerful
figure, but Campbell operates more behind the scenes
than up front. I mean Carlile is out imploring,
motivating the masses at rallies, the torchlight rallies
and parades. While Campbell is very eloquent in
voice calling for resistance. Campbell certainly is as
important figure as Carlile, but he is just not as visible
to the public. In time, of course, Campbell perhaps
becomes the most powerful unionist. That's a
judgment call, but in the sense that the
Intelligencer, the Wheeling
Intelligencer is disseminated throughout the
northwestern part and its Campbell's voice, more than
any other; but then again, of course, you have Senator
Wade Ben Willey as well as Carlile and you have
Sheriff Clemmons and John Davisson and Senator
Van Winkle, all these people are important, but,
really, its Carlile is the "Darling of the Masses" if you
will. He is the single, most important politician in
1861.
Q: Describe, if you can, try to make the leap
back and describe what you mentioned to me that
western Virginia was charged with excitement during
this secession, these months surrounding April.
JJGD 0627
RC: Well, West Virginia, western Virginians were
charged with excitement here in April and May of
1861 because Virginia has succeeded and, but not
only are they opposed to secession and to treason, but
they view this as an opportunity that they have been
waiting 30 years for. Here is our opportunity to
create a new state, the state of New Virginia; some
wanted to call it the State of Kanawha, but it was
ultimately called the state of West Virginia, but here
is our opportunity. These people have, these eastern
Virginians have dealt with us as the peasantry of the
west, long enough. They have called us disdainfully,
"Hewers of Wood, Drawers of Water." They have
discriminated against us in representation and
taxation. They look upon us as sub-humans. Here is
our chance to strike back. Here is our chance to assert
our individuality, our independence -- a new
state.
JJGD 0718
We West Virginians, this is, our time has come, and
it's the secession crisis which allows all these pent-up
emotions and feelings and frustrations that had been
building for 30-40 years. Now we can do something.
Our day has come. We will create a new state loyal
to the Union and we will --. In other words, their
enthusiasm was as much for creating the new state as
it was to defeat the Confederacy and defeat treason.
On local terms, and regional terms, here is our
chance, let's take it, let's not blow it, you know and
Carlile is in the forefront calling for the new state of
New Virginia in the Clarksburg Resolutions and in
the two Wheeling Conventions they take dramatic
action in forming the reorganized government of
Virginia with Francis Pierpont being declared
Governor. Pierpont being recognized by Lincoln as
the legal governor, the de jure governor of the state of
Virginia.
JJGD 0835
Which he had a right to do, by the way,
constitutionally because in the Door Rebellion in
Rhode Island in the 1840's the Supreme Court had
decided that, in Luther versus Gordon, that when
there were two rival governments, where
administrations claiming to be the legal government
of a state, the President of the United States had the
right to determine which one was de jure. This is how
the Wheeling government under the leadership of
Francis Pierpont became recognized as the legal
government of the state of all of Virginia and Pierpont
remained governor of Virginia throughout the War
and he was the reconstruction governor of Virginia, as
well.
Q: Let me stop you for a second. He's an
unlikely lead role. Pierpont -- he's not even there at
the Richmond Convention. He's not even there
playing an out-front role like John Carlile. Where
does he come from? What's your paragraph on
Francis Pierpont?
RC: Well, Pierpont. All I can say about Pierpont is
that he was like a -- I don't have any personal
empathy say for Waitman Willey or Francis Pierpont
or ??? Van -- Senator -- ... but I really don't have
sense of them people. I do have a sense of Carlile.
Q: Go into that then. Tell me about Carlile.
JJGD 1000
RC: Well, Carlile has a flair for the dramatic, he is a
very emotional individual; he has very strong
opinions about society and politics.
Q: I want that; we're going to do that.
RICHARD CURRY, APRIL 30, SOUND ROLL
102, CAMERA ROLL 260
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 6, CAMERA 260,
SOUND 102
Q: ... tell me about John Carlile, tell me about
him.
JJGD 1047
RC: Well, the sense I have of John Carlile is a very
dramatic individual with a flair for histrionic, if you
will. A politician, a man with a mission, a man who
loves to communicate, a man who likes to hear
himself talk, I suppose too. But nevertheless, the man
has very passionate feelings about causes, about
events. Carlile is able to deliver speeches, very
emotional speeches, go on for hours and hold people
in the palm of his hand. But Carlile is also believes
with such passion I think with such intensity, because
he was an ideologue. I mean not only did he favor the
new state of Virginia, but he had a view of the world
in which he believed, he had a view of reality, a
perception of reality, which was to carry over into
statehood politics. In this instance, of course, his
passion, his enthusiasm serves him well, because John
Carlile is in tune with the people of western Virginia
or the vast majority of them.
JJGD 1177
Within a year or two, John Carlile is no longer in
step; he's out of tune, but he doesn't lose the passion;
he doesn't lose the sense of the dramatic, but he
becomes however not a hero anymore, but a man who
to be scorned, a man who is looked upon as a trader
to the new state movement. But that didn't deter John
Carlile from being himself. That didn't deter John
Carlile from continuing to hold ideas that were very
close to his heart, which were no longer in favor in
western Virginia. Sure, in the minority of democrats,
of conservative democrats, people like John Jay
Davis, the father of John W. Davis, of Congressman
??? Clemmons, and other conservative democrats.
But they were becoming increasingly in the minority.
Carlile never turned against the idea of a new state in
principle; it was no the new state that he turned
against, but what he turned against were Republican
policies. What he turned against was the Lincoln
Administration.
JJGD 1287
He didn't like Lincoln's suspensions of habeas corpus.
He didn't like attacks on newspapers which disagreed
with the Republican policies or policies. He didn't
like the Willey amendment which stated that West
Virginia would have to become a free state before it
could enter the union; it wasn't you see that Carlile
objected to the new state; he didn't want what he
called "congressional dictation." That's what I mean
when I say he was an ideologue; he is not a man who
will compromise. He is saying: I will do things
because I choose to do them, not because I want to be
forced by Washington or Congress or anyone else to
do it. So what appears to be opposition to the new
state, is really, is a world view, a political agenda if
you will, which has been very difficult for many
people to understand.
JJGD 1378
They've been puzzled as to why Carlile seemed to
turn against the movement. It's not that he turned
against the movement, but the fact that as far as he
was concerned, he didn't want a new state on the
terms on which it was being offered. And he did then
take steps to try to defeat the Willey amendment. But
if he could have had the new state on his own terms,
he would have gladly have chosen it. But he couldn't
have a new state on his own terms, and he was not
flexible enough to compromise.
Q: Let me stop you there; let me ask you, you
made a statement that Carlile was an ideologue; he
operated on the basis if ideas and principles --
RC: Preconceived ideas and principles, yes.
Q: What was his idea in his mind of this new
state? What would it be, what would it present, what
would it embrace?
JJGD 1471
RC: Well, it wasn't so much the state itself that
concerned him, but the -- true, he wanted an
independent state, which could govern itself, no doubt
about that, but in this crisis, what concerned him was
not so much where the procedures, the processes, by
which the state was being created.
Q: I don't mean to interrupt you. Let me ask you
in a different way. When Carlile said we must have a
new state and we will call that state New Virginia,
who was his audience? Who was he talking to?
RC: All right, he was talking to the people of western
Virginia.
Q: Would you say John Carlile, would you start
again, sorry.
JJGD 1541
RC: John Carlile agreed with western Virginians in
the sense that he resented eastern domination of
western Virginia. He resented the fact that western
Virginians were underrepresented, which I have said
before, and did not get as much money as they
deserved for schools or for internal improvements. In
that sense he resented being scorned and disparaged
by the eastern aristocracy as they called
themselves.
Q: Bear with me; tell me the resentments that
John Carlile harbored?
JJGD 1606
RC: John Carlile, like most western Virginians,
resented eastern domination of the state. They
resented underrepresentation in the House of
Burgesses. They resented the fact that they were
taxed at a higher rate, yet received fewer dollars in
return for such things as education and internal
improvements such as canals and railroads. In that
John Carlile was one with the people. He also
resented the arrogance of the slaveocracy and their
contempt for western Virginia and western Virginians
and in characterizing western Virginians as being the
"peasantry of the west." However, John Carlile had a
view of what government itself should be like
however state it should be in, or the United States. He
was an extreme states right ideologue. He was like --
someone like John Taylor of Carolina or someone
like Patrick Henry. I mean you have states rights
advocates, but these people were extreme
localists.
JJGD 1718
They did not even favor someone like John Taylor of
Carolina, didn't want the United States of America.
He was fearful of centralization of power. He wanted
state sovereignty. This was the position Carlile came
out of, and extreme states rights advocate, and
ideologue who believed almost in state sovereignty.
He recognized the need for central government to
serve minimal functions to defend us say against
foreign intervention, but he did not grant in theory the
right of the central government to undertake actions
which would undercut what he thought were the
sovereign rights of the state. It's what is called. . .
"Why do non-slaveholding southerners support
secession? Carlile wasn't one of them of course.
JJGD 1802
But he called a crisis a Republicanism, that some non
slaveholding white southerners went along with
secession not because they supported slavery, but
because they bitterly resented the fact that the central
government was going to use force to preserve the
union. I mean they would rather have seen the union
be dissolved than to see the central government use
power and force. I mean Tennessee didn't succeed
from the Union after all until after Lincoln called for
troops.
Q: Let me interrupt you there. ...
CURRY INTERVIEW TAKE 7
Q: Tell me about the two civil wars.
JJGD 1875
RC: What is often overlooked in analyses of Civil
War politics in the north is the fact that when we talk
about the Civil War, we're really talking about two
civil wars. One is the military confrontation between
the Union states and those who remain loyal to the
Confederacy. It's not simply a conflict between slave
states and free states because the border slave holding
states remain loyal to the Union. The political
confrontation I'm talking about in contrast to the
military one was a political and ideological contest
between northern Republicans and northern
Democrats. To determine not only whether the Union
should be preserved, or determine whether or not
slavery should be destroyed or retained, but determine
the whole future nature and course of American
history. The type of government, the type of political
traditions that would prevail.
JJGD 1974
The democrats had been in power since 1801 with
Lincoln's election with the exception of a couple of
Whig presidents, this is a democratic period. Now
you're coming into the great Republican age, where
the Republican party will be in control between 1860
and 1933, with a couple of exceptions, major
exceptions. But the Democratic party is fast
becoming the party of memory, if you will. And the
Republican party, the party of future, of change. And
the Republican party represents emancipation and
freedom and liberty and expanding freedom to include
slaves, blacks.
WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY PROJECT, APRIL 30, 1993 CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 8, CAMERA 261, SOUND 103
Q: Dick, tell me about the war erupts and in to
northwestern the armies meet. Tell me about the
battle of Rich Mountain. Tell me about William
Rosecrans, old Rosy, and his military genius and then
tell me about the importance of that Union
victory?
JJGE 0050
RC: Well, West Virginia to state briefly ??? critical
important strategically to the North, as a buffer
between the Confederacy and the North, and also the
B & O Railroad was extremely important and as the
Lincoln said, the manpower of the state was important
too. Also, it was the key to the upper Mississippi.
Having control of this area, to be able to go to
Kentucky down the Mississippi, but Rich Mountain is
the key battle. McClellan gets most of the credit,
McClellan to the rescue. McClellan, I don't know if
he referred to himself as the "Napoleon of the West"
but he must have paid someone to use that title. Very
histrionic, very self serving. In fact McClellan
thought that God had called him to take over the
leadership of the Union forces, the Union armies, to
win the War. Unfortunately, I don't know whose
voices he was hearing it, it didn't work out the way he
had intended, but the Battle of Rich Mountain is a
perfect example of this.
JJGE 0159
McClellan received credit for the victory because he
was the, not U. S. general at this point, but he was
major general of Ohio volunteers in command of
Ohio and Indiana troops that invaded western
Virginia, not U. S. troops per se. But McClellan
received the credit for victory of Rich Mountain, but
it really was Rosecrans who deserves the credit. It's
Rosecrans who discovered the path across the
mountain to outflank Garnet and the Confederates.
Unfortunately, McClellan was very fearful to commit
his troops to combat. McClellan wanted to outflank,
he wanted to avoid head-on combat. McClellan just
does not deserve the credit for the victory for Rich
Mountain that he got. Rosecrans did. Yet, it
propelled McClellan into the national limelight, and
Lincoln, searching for generals, which he did until the
end of the war, until he discovered Grant and
Sherman and Sheridan and others.
JJGE 0265
McClellan was because of his victories in western
Virginia, was given the command of the army of the
Potomac. And he was a marvelous general, to defend
him in the sense that he was able to organize an army,
to train them, to drill them, to equip them. He just
wasn't able to utilize them in battle. Why? Because
he fought great, he was a great defensive general, but
he could not launch offensive operations. And I mean
he should have defeated Lee, the Peninsular
Campaign, and taken Richmond. He should have
won Antietam; he was --
Q: Let's get back to July. What was the reaction
in northwestern Virginia of the victory in July?
JJGE 0329
RC: Well, it was a great morale booster for not only
northwestern Virginians, but for Americans in general
because of the other disasters, like the first battle of
Bull Run. This was the first great Union victory of the
war. And it also assured the success of the statehood
movement, but you have then the occupation, if you
will of northwestern Virginia by Union troops and
you have protection of the B & O Railroad, which
allows the Union army to shift troops to east and west
with facility. It also assured order and stability,
which was essential for politics to occur, for the
political process to occur. However, that victory of
McClellan and Rosecrans at Rich Mountain applied
or influenced events only in the northwestern. It
didn't influence events in the central and southern part
of the state, where -- which is dominated primarily by
guerrilla warfare.
JJGE 0438
Union troops controlled the cities and the roadways
and the rivers during the day, but not at night. And
normal political activity simply couldn't occur in the
rest of western Virginia. It's in the northwest where
union sentiment is pretty dominant any way. But the
influence of the Union government didn't extend far,
far south of Parkersburg.
Q: After the victory at Rich Mountain in July,
the South sends up one of its greatest military leaders
to try to resurrect or to try to reverse these loses in
western Virginia. Lee comes in August and struggles
and struggles. What does Lee campaign tell us about
the difficulties of waging warfare in western Virginia
in the Mountains?
JJGE 0535
RC: It was doomed to defeat. The terrain, itself, was
enough to defeat any invading army. I mean this was
why the Wheeling government for example couldn't
extend its influence very far south, simply because of
the terrain. Thirty men well placed in a mountain
gorge, could hold off a regiment, an army. Lee didn't
have the manpower; he didn't have the equipment;
even if he had very little opposition to his attempt to
enter Virginia, the terrain and the elements would
have bogged him down. I think it would have been
very difficult for Lee to conquer the northwest under
any circumstances. Lee would have been faced with
tremendous odds, not only because of the terrain the
weather, but the hostile population. It was a hopeless
cause once the Confederates had been driven out of
this mountainous terrain.
JJGE 0635
In the northwestern counties, which were Unionists,
this assured statehood, but it would make it
impossible for the Confederates to retake that area,
but at the same time it made it impossible for the
Union forces to dominate the whole state. General
Fremont, who was banished to western Virginia after
the fiasco in Missouri when he was in command there,
back and forth the armies ran without any decisive
moment. The decisive moment was Rich Mountain,
which guaranteed the success of the statehood
movement. It did not guarantee the order, the
creation of order and stability in most of West
Virginia.
Q: Describe what it was like to have so much of
the state under the atmosphere of the bushwhacker
and the guerrilla raids? What was it like for the
people living here, the civilians? What did it pack on
their lives?
JJGE 0741
RC: The fear, of course and the uncertainty. I mean
if I'm not mistaken, feuds such as Hatfield and
McCoy really got started under these kinds of
circumstances, perhaps during the Civil War, where
grudges and feuds .... I'll try to phrase it differently.
That West Virginia and Missouri, but particularly
West Virginia was one of the few places in the United
States where there really was a Civil War, brother
against brother, this guerrilla warfare in southern
West Virginia and central West Virginia, I mean you
do have divisions where brother fights brother, uncle
against cousin, father against son. This is -- they talk
about a brothers' war, but only in the border states,
and particularly West Virginia, Missouri is this true.
There's one in the bushwhacker's war, those series of
letters that I edited with Gerald, Jerry Hann? years
ago.
JJGE 0843
This one account where the brother came across the
body of his own brother who had been killed and
strung up by "bushwhackers", but the fear and
uncertainty of -- I mean, it's nothing like what's going
on in say Bosnia and Hersogovenia, I mean that kind
of brutality and atrocity, but on a lesser scale, you do
have these kinds of atrocities occurring.
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 9
Q: Let's warm up to it by describe to me,
bushwhackers, who they were, what they did, who
supported them?
JJGE 0920
RC: I'd like to know where the term bushwhacking
came from, but it's another word for guerrilla warfare.
And West Virginia I think is almost unique. I mean
you have guerrilla warfare in Missouri as well, but no
where do you have greater I think in terms of ???
conflict, neighbor against neighbor, and relative
against relative, as you do in the southern part of
West Virginia where the population is
pro-Confederate and is very definitely very hostile to
Union army of occupation or who sweep through
from time to time where there is general Abe ??? and
his victory at Droop Mountain or where it is General
? Cox, conquering the Kanawha. They don't really
conquer southern West Virginia; they don't even
control it. I mean they control the cities, the rivers,
the needs of transportation --
RICHARD CURRY INTERVIEW, APR 30,
SOUND ROLL 104, WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY
PROJECT
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 10
Q: Tell me about bushwhackers as a symbol of
social disintegration of West Virginia?
JJGE 1035
RC: Bushwhacking occurred primarily in the central
counties and the southern counties of the state, those
areas that were I would say nominally under Union
military control. The Kanawha Valley, the Union
armies who occupied the major cities such as
Charleston normally controlled the waterways, but
they didn't cover the surrounding, did not control the
surrounding countryside. And most of the population
was loyal to the Confederacy anyway, but the
guerrilla warfare simply shows the inability of the
union army really to govern or to control western
Virginia, northwestern Virginia where the population
was already committed to Union, there were no
problem, but the rest of the state could not be
governed and these roving bands of bushwhackers or
the guerrilla warfare, to some extent, reflects -- well,
obviously it reflects social instability in the state in
the fact that it is ungovernable, to some extent it
reflects anti-union sentiment.
JJGE 1141
I mean that is their major concern is trying to achieve
the independence of the Confederacy, but I think
what's going on here too is self-serving of processes
by roving bands of cut throats who are raiding farms
and villages and homes out of either revenge motives
or a desire to whatever profit they can derive. And
they didn't much care whether their victims were
unionists or confederates.
Q: What did they create? What kind of an
atmosphere, what effect did they have on the
people?
JJGE 1212
RC: I would probably say that the fear of guerrilla
warfare of r the fear of bushwhackers was probably
greater than their ? because you can find numerous
incidents of -- serious atrocities that did occur. But
it's not as pervasive. The fear is there. The fear of
attack is there, but it's not a mass slaughter on any
large scale. It's relatively small scale stuff, small
scale warfare. I mean you may be talking about
scores, a few scores of people who were kills, not tens
of thousands of people who were killed or who were
slaughtered. It does, however, create, it contributes, it
doesn't create in itself, but it contributes to the
bitterness of reconstruction politics after the war
because one the war is fought and over and union
refugees are coming back to Kanawha county and to
Greenbrier and to Monroe and to Cabell and
elsewhere.
JJGE 1339
The state legislature of Virginia dominated by the
unionists from the northwest pass laws, punitive laws,
designed to punish people for their beliefs, punish not
only bushwhackers but to punish people had been
confederates, loyal to the Confederacy. To give you
specific examples of legislation, laws were passed
saying that no one who had supported the confederacy
could sue in court, no one, the teachers Test Oath
though if you had, a sign up saying that in order to be
a teacher or a minister or a lawyer, you had to be Test
Oath saying that you had supported the Union. In
other words, the Union minority in these northern and
southern counties were able to exact their pound of
flesh or revenge out against friends or former friends
or relatives or neighbors who had exploited them or
who had contributed to their suffering during the war.
But it also allowed the Republican party to remain in
control of politics of the state.
JJGE 1450
Because what happens in reconstruction is because so
many counties were pro-confederate, but 1870 West
Virginia is under control of the Democratic party
once again and the conservative democrats, union
democrats and the confederate democrats got together
and by 1870 the state-makers, the unconditional
unionists, the Willeys, the Boremans, they're out of
office, and never again will they control during the
nineteenth century the politics of the state. So one of
the bitter inheritances of including confederate
counties in the new state -- and that is John Carlile's
heritage to West Virginia -- he concluded so many
confederate counties in the state, it didn't destroy the
statehood movement, but it did result in turning the
state over to the conservative union democrats and to
the ex-confederates who join forces after the war
during reconstruction.
JJGE 1552
And so, the era of the oath kept the Republicans in
power or the state-makers for five years, but finally
by 1870, as Horace Greely said to Archibald
Campbell I believe it was, or to some West Virginia
politician, "Every year," he said, "one thousand of
your rebels die." Now you disenfranchise them and
the question is: Will they disenfranchise you? So
there is an attempt in 1872, the so-called liberal
Republican movement, to try to liberalize the political
situation, to reform it. There's the hope that
ex-Whigs, people that had been Whigs might join the
republican party. [Tech difficulties] Because ? had
come together on the basis of common economic
interests, but actually it was the north-south broken
federate, pro-union hatreds that predominated. This
didn't work. By 1870, West Virginia was now back
under the control, ironically, of ex-confederates who
had been included in the new state against their will.
And that is one of the great ironies of West Virginia
history, is that people who made it, lost it, and lost it
within five years, and again as I said Senator Carlile
contributed mightily to that reality.
Q: That's very good. Let's go in. We've got a
little stage. It's nearing the end of 1862, we've got a
proposal for a new state in Congress, drafted by John
Carlile, who is now starting to turn against the
northwesterners headed by Campbell, represented in
part by Willey ? [tech difficulties...can't hear]
JJGE 1754
RC: If Carlile were sitting here, I suspect he would
say to us is: I wasn't against West Virginia; I wasn't
against the new state movement. What I objected to
was Congressional dictation. What I objected to was
centralization power, in the hands of the ? government
in an ideologue we could have had statehood on my
terms, without having congress dictate to us that we
had to abolish slavery before we could become a
state, I would have voted for it. On the other hand,
Senator Willey might well have looked at Carlile and
said: But despite your protestations, that you weren't
against the new-state movement, but were against
congressional dictation, your strategy would have led
to the destruction of the new state. The new state
never could have been created.
JJGE 1836
In fact, Senator Carlile, let's stop kidding ourselves.
The strategy that you adopted would have destroyed
the new state because you wanted to include 72
counties; one of your bills called for the inclusion of
most of the valley counties of Virginia, which if it
wouldn't have stopped the new state movement, it
certainly would have turned it over to the control of
the conservative union democrats and the
confederates almost immediately after the war. So,
don't tell me in effect that you were, that your
objection was basically ideological congressional
dictation. In practical terms, who attempted to
destroy the heart and soul of what the new state
movement was all about and that was eastern
domination.
JJGE 1910
Lincoln on the other hand, people asked would he
sign the West Virginia bill, on January 1, 1863? And
some people expressed doubts and reservations. And
in retrospect there was never really any question
about what Lincoln was going to do. He wanted, he
favored the Willey amendment, in fact it was Lincoln
who I think suggested the Willey amendment, he
certainly was very much behind it because it's a
symbol, an attack on the institution of slavery. And
even though there were only 18,000 slaves in West
Virginia and even though the West Virginians say and
the conservatives that they would abolish it in time,
it's a symbol of our commitment to freedom and
emancipation. We must have West Virginia as a 'free'
state, not as a slave state. We can admit no new slave
states. That's what we would have, West Virginia
would have been a slave state if the Willey
amendment had not been required. So Lincoln said
we must have that requirement and he knew that most
western Virginians wanted a new state and they did
not agree or sympathize with Senator Carlile.
ROLL 105, WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY
PROJECT, RICHARD CURRY INTERVIEW
CURRY INTERVIEW TAKE 11, CAMERA 263,
SOUND 105
Q: Why did he have to sign that bill?
RC: He couldn't afford not to sign the bill for a
variety of reasons. One, by requiring the --
Q: Could you start again with Lincoln .... ?
RC: Lincoln could not afford not have done anything
else but sign the bill for a variety of reasons. First of
all ....
CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 12
JJGF 0061
RC: Lincoln couldn't have done anything else but
sign the statehood bill, despite the fears of some of his
contemporaries in not being certain in what he might
do, but the reason I say couldn't. Here the Willey
amendment now has been passed. It's gotten through
Congress. West Virginia becomes a free state. This
is a symbol of the Union's opposition, the Republican
party's opposition to slavery. So in symbolic terms it's
terrible important as an attack upon the South in this
peculiar ???institution Beyond that, Lincoln is able
to -- the manpower question he talks about, too -- the
consequences of not signing the West Virginia
statehood bill, that we cannot disappoint these loyal
Virginians. He said something to the effect that some
say that is also secession and what is the difference
between secession of West Virginia from
Virginia.
JJGF 0162
He said: Well, if we call it secession, surely there's a
difference between secession to the Union than from
the Union. But he was fearful that had he not signed
the bill this would have created such a unstable
situation and such a --what's the word I'm looking
for? -- dispirited populous that this might not result in
-- can I shut up?
Q: Yes, try it again. Say if he wouldn't have
signed the bill he was fearful that --
JJGF 0220
RC: What I'm trying to get at is that the shortage of
troops in '63, it's the same day he signs he orders the
black troops enrolled in the Union army. He signs the
emancipation proclamation, the West Virginia
statehood bill, and calls for black troops in the Union
army the same day. And one of the things he talks
about is that we need every West Virginian, every
mother's son, to fight in the Union army, to volunteer,
we need West Virginia regiments already in the field
to re-volunteer. I mean he is very conscious that if he
hadn't signed the bill, this would have been so
disappointing that he would have lost the support
perhaps of the populous. The strategic importance of
the state of course was critical, but again to
emphasize the need for manpower and support
because they started you know subscription,
conscription in 1863. ? [BATTERY]
CURRY INTERVIEW TAKE 13
Q: John Carlile?
JJGF 0336
RC: John Carlile is a fascinating individual who
deserved the prominence that he enjoyed in the early
months of the War, where he opposed secession or he
led the forces that led toward the creation of the new
state, which became West Virginia. But in the end
Carlile is not a sympathetic figure. Carlile, according
to his own likes, did not turn against the new state.
He would have liked to have had a new state under
his terms. But John Carlile, with his rigid
commitment to ideology, with his commitment, with
his fierce opposition to what he called congressional
dictation, his fear of centralized power,
understandable feeling perhaps, certainly not unusual
for 19th century democrats to take. But in the end to
West Virginians I should say he is not a sympathetic
figure because his strategy and tactics, despite his
protestations that he favored a new state, would have
led to its defeat.
JJGF 0454
And I don't think John Carlile -- he was a man of
principle, his own principles, whether you or I agree
with them or anyone else agree with them or not, he
was a man of principle. And he was not willing to
surrender those principles. But he was not a
pragmatist so I think he can be admired for his
willingness to adhere to principle, but I don't find him
a sympathetic figure because in the end he was an
anachronism??; he was looking backward and the
actions that he took, despite his own protestations,
would have led to the defeat of the new state.
However, John Carlile in my view probably never
understood why he was defeated; why he was
rejected; why he became an object of complete scorn.
He moved as you know to Maryland after his term as
senator from Virginia, the Pierpont government, after
that term was over.
JJGF 0552
And he unsuccessfully ran for office there. Again,
under the same principles, as a conservative,
strict-construction, states-rights ideologue, but was
defeated. Then he came back to West Virginia and I
think became a farmer and then died a very lonely
and distraught individual. But he was no more of a
contradiction I think than any other politicians. I
mean, this was a revolutionary period, a period of
transition, and John Carlile's ideas which were
perfectly comprehensible in the 1830's and perhaps
even representative of Democratic thought and the
revolutionary situation that resulted in emancipation
and the thirteenth and fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments and ultimately led to a greater role by
the federal government in American life, he could
neither approve of it, nor understand it. And rather
than, he could not adjust to change, and being unable
to adjust to change, he willingly consigned himself to
oblivion.
Q: Great! Let's take a cut.
CURRY INTERVIEW TAKE 14
Q: In 1774 the frontier was a nasty place. Tell
me about it.
JJGF 0707
RC: Indeed. John Murray, the last royal governor of
Virginia who was known as "Lord Dunmore"
becomes governor of Virginia. And he leads an
expedition from Williamsburg to the Ohio River. He
takes one wing of his army north towards
Parkersburg, that area and then General Andrew
Lewis of Greenbrier, then known I think as West
Augusta, General Andrew Lewis takes the army
southern wing down to Point Pleasant where an
intense battle with Cornstalk and the Shawnee after a
very intense battle, which the outcome was uncertain
for a time, resulted in Andrew Lewis' triumph over
Cornstalk. This pacified the frontier for a period of
two years after the Revolution began in 1775.
JJGF 0820
And certainly this was certainly useful to Virginia, the
colony of Virginia in conducting the revolution, when
they didn't have to worry about Indian attacks in the
frontier. That's getting a bit ahead of the story.
Dunmore, after that battle, then negotiated the Treaty
of Fort Charlotte, and signed treaties with the Indians
and then came back to Williamsburg and Dunmore
for a short time was considered to be a very heroic
figure by Virginians. The House of Burgesses which
Lord Dunmore as royal governor dissolved. They
met as the revolutionary government of Virginia and
they passed a resolution congratulating Lord
Dunmore for leading the attack on the Shawnee.
Every town in western Virginia virtually every
county, numerous letters or petitions congratulating
Dunmore for his enlightened action, were received by
the governor.
JJGF 0939
Yet, within a short period of time, Dunmore became a
very sinister figure in Virginia, considered to be
sinister. Because what did he do? He tried to start a
slave insurrection in Virginia and said to the slaves:
If you will rise up and defend the crown against the
revolutionaries, you will get your freedom. Failing in
that, he tried to engage General Andrew Lewis, the
hero of Point Pleasant, in battle, decisively defeated
by Lewis. He saw that his situation was helpless and
burned the town of Norfolk and sailed away, where
he became royal governor in the Bahamas.
WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY PROJECT
SOUND ROLL 106, APR 30,
RICHARD CURRY INTERVIEW, TAKE 15,
CAMERA 264, SOUND ROLL 106
Q: Tell me about this guy, complex and
interesting character?
JJGF 1030
RC: Who was Lord Dunmore? He was a cousin to
the queen of England, but he was a poor nobleman,
Lord Dunmore with no money. Why else would he
come to America to a frontier, to a wilderness?
Because he did not have the money to spend it in the
salons of Paris or in London, so here he is first
governor of New York, he gets a hundred thousand
acres, deeded to him, for land speculation purposes.
And it's no secret that he wanted a hundred thousand
acres more in Virginia. But that's -- so he was trying
to enrich himself, make his career as a civil servant, in
order to make a success in life because he inherited no
wealth, no land, only title.
Q: How was he going to get a hundred thousand
acres in Virginia? Give me his strategy?
JJGF 1118
RC: Well, the land itself, the speculators,
Washington managed to get two hundred thousand
acres. The British Foreign Office would grant land
grants to land companies or to individuals, but he
wanted the British Foreign Office in the name of the
king to grant him a hundred thousand acres in partial
payment for his services, his salary, and bonuses if
you will. The British government would make these
grants. For example, every soldier who fought in the
French and Indian War was supposed to get a
hundred eighty acres if you were I think an enlisted
man, so many more acres if you were an officer. And
instead of money, they would give you land. This is
how Washington acquired two hundred thousand
acres in the Kanawha valley area because he bought
up these land grants.
JJGF 1212
The British government however chastised Dunmore.
Dunmore said that colonials were entitled to their
grants and ordered the grants to be given to them.
The British government said no, no. This was not
intended for colonials, only for British officers.
Dunmore was at odds with British policy. Dunmore
was in many ways a very far-sighted governor, not
that he wasn't self-interested. Yes, we're all
self-interested, we want to be successful. In order to
be successful means you can be self-interested, but
not unenlightened, necessarily. And I don't think
Dunmore was unenlightened; I think he was a terribly
enlightened royal governor who understood more
clearly than Lord Dartmouth, the British foreign
secretary, what was going on in America and
particularly what was going on in Virginia.
JJGF 1288
So Lord Dunmore led this expedition to the Ohio, not
only enrich himself but to stop a bitter civil war that
had been going on since 1763. The royal
proclamation line had been established by the British
government after the French & Indian war, and they
said: no further settlement until notice; we want to
pacify the frontier; we want to sign treaties with the
Indians. Well, it was a substitute foreign policy. The
British government did nothing. And what happened
did the royal proclamation keep Virginians from
going into West Virginia? No. Thirty thousand
Virginians, including many of my ancestors and that
of many other presently West Virginians crossed the
mountains into West Virginia and neither the royal
proclamation, nor the native Americans, or the
Indians, nor Lord Dunmore, nor the British
government, could stop it. It was inevitable conflict
of cultures between the native American culture,
trying to stop European expansion in the frontier, and
they couldn't do it.
JJGF 1392
So Lord Dunmore is thrown into the fray here. And
what does he do? Well, he says: Okay, there's a
savage guerrilla warfare, internecine warfare going on
here. Men, women and children being killed,
hundreds, both sides Indians and Whites. He wanted
to stop that. But at the same time, he said: Look
what's happening. These settlers have gone across
the, had defied British policy, they've gone into
western Virginia, they're all the way up to the Ohio
River. I can't stop them; you can't stop them. Why
did I do what I did? He defended himself to Lord
Dartmouth? Why did I authorize this expedition and
authorize these land grants to individuals? To
maintain British authority. Because your policy is
bankrupt because I can't stop them, you can't stop
them. So, to use his phrase, Lord Dunmore, I
extended British authority to the Ohio. This is
preferable to a set of democratic governments of their
own.
JJGF 1503
Well, he was acting in his self-interests; he is acting in
the interests of the Virginians; he was acting in the
interests of the British government as he perceived it.
Because as he said, They're going to establish
independence from us, so my policy is designed not
only to enrich myself or to recognize the claims of the
Virginians and to stop this terrible civil war, but to
maintain British crown rule in Virginia. Your policy
is bankrupt. The British government never
understood what they called "Dunmore's
insubordination." Had he not been related to the
queen of England, he probably would have been
removed. In other words I think Dunmore understood
from a British point of view much more clearly what
was going on, much more clearly what needed to be
done than Lord Dartmouth in the British foreign
office. And for his troubles he was threatened with
dismissal and he was severely chastised.
Q: Now the irony, is it not, that the Battle of
Point Pleasant clears the air along the Ohio -- the
Shawnees are pushed across the Ohio -- and
Virginians can now turn themselves to a new foe, the
British? Tell me about the impact of Lewis' sort of
Pyrrhic victory?
JJGF 1644
RC: Right. The irony is as I see it is that Dunmore
who actually champions rights of colonials and who
pacified the frontier which eventually helped the
revolutionaries, the Virginians, they didn't have to
worry about attack from their frontier because of
Lord Dunmore's war, the irony is that history, that his
reputation in history, Lord Dunmore, has come to be
looked upon as a sinister figure. I think in popular
mythology, even by some historians, and actually
Lord Dunmore was a very, I think a very sharp and
able perceptive individual who doesn't deserve the
bum rap he's gotten in history. Now, but of course
this is all taken from a Euro-centric? point of view.
We cannot native Americans to share the same view
of Lord Dunmore or of the Virginians as others may.
But, in context of British policy and of Virginia's
desires to expand to the Ohio, Dunmore had a much
more realistic conception than anyone else I
think.
Q: Let me ask you a final question. And this is ? What's your impression, from a distance, what's your impression about West Virginia in sort of capsule form and its arc from 1863 to the present? I mean in a way West Virginia's still trying to ...
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